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JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES: A COMPARISON
Friedrich Juenger*

I signed up for the first seminar Eric Stein taught at Ann Arbor before
the Rome Treaty instituting the Economic Community was ratified and
when the European Coal and Steel Community was still young. European
integration has long since become an economic and political reality. To be
sure, the Communities have had their ups and downs, as has Europe's relationship with the United States. But despite the Common Market's current
woes and the complaints of American farmers about European protectionism, we should not overlook the fact that the Communities present the most
impressive experiment in supranationalism the world has seen. For lawyers
in this country, the Communities' law and institutions present a tempting
field of inquiry because, as Justice Potter Stewart remarked, "there are important similarities in the goals and institutional characteristics of the two
systems," and because the Communities' "Court of Justice has been called
upon to play a role that . . . appears very similar to that performed by the
Supreme Court of the United States." 1
Eric Stein deserves our gratitude for making European integration accessible to American students and teachers. He has taught and written
widely on this important subject, and the casebook he published with Hay
and Waelbroeck2 is a valuable aid for dispelling what a judge of the Communities' Court of Justice called "splendid mutual ignorance."3 Following
Judge Pescatore's suggestion that it is time to take note of the experience
gathered on both sides of the Atlantic,4 it seems worthwhile to compare the
evolution of jurisdictional principles in the United States and in the Common Market.5
• Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. M.C.L. 1957, University of Michigan; J.D. 1960, Columbia University.- Ed.
1. Stewart, Foreword, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS vii (f. Sandalow & E. Stein eds.
1982); see also Preface, HARMONIZATION OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES vii (P.
Herzog ed. 1983).
2. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
IN PERSPECTIVE (1976).
3. Pescatore, Foreword, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS, supra note 1, at x.
4. Id
5. Justice White has noted that the United States is a "common market" whose component
states have retained attributes of sovereignty. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). As his felicitous observation suggests, the functions which jurisdictional principles must serve in this country and in the European Communities are sufficiently
similar to warrant comparison.
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AMERICAN LAW

The American law of jurisdiction has been shaped primarily by the
United States Supreme Court which, for well over a century, has claimed
the power to control state jurisdictional practices. Originally, it derived this
power from the full faith and credit clause,6 until a dictum in Pennoyer v.
Ne.If' established that "proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process oflaw." 8 To delineate the jurisdiction
of state courts, about which the fourteenth amendment was silent, Justice
Field's opinion in Pennoyer invoked legal history and dogma. He defined
due process to mean "a course oflegal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence."9 But he also cited Story's conflicts treatise 10 to support the propositions that "every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory" and that "no tribunal . . . can
extend its process beyond that territory to subject either persons or property
to its decisions." 11 From these premises Justice Field concluded that, with
limited exceptions, 12 jurisdiction can only be acquired by a symbolic exercise of sovereignty: personal service of process within the state to proceed in
personam and the attachment of local assets for actions quasi in rem.
Justice Field's opinion demonstrates the pitfalls of undiscerning reliance
on dogmatic considerations. His effort to elevate common law practices to
the status of immutable constitutional principle proved to be seriously misguided. Due process and state sovereignty do not easily mix because states'
rights have little in common with the protection of individual freedoms and
the attempt to blend these disparate ingredients was bound to breed anomalies. As Justice Hunt's dissent points out, it is unconvincing to let the constitutionality of state court jurisdiction hinge on the elusive distinction
between actions in personam and in rem . 13 Nor is it possible to explain why
some magic act such as service or attachment should be required for asserting sovereign prerogatives. Equally fl.awed are the policy reasons that Justice Field adduced to justify premising jurisdiction on the ministrations of
process servers and sheriffs, for his arguments confuse the requirement of
6. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404,406 (1856); D'Arcy v. Ketchum,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174-75 (1850); cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878).
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
8. 95 U.S. at 733. The fourteenth amendment had not yet been enacted when the state
court judgment at issue was rendered.
9. 95 U.S. at 733.
IO. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19, 22, 682 (7th ed. 1872).
11. 95 U.S. at 722, 723 (citing STORY, supra note IO, at ch. 2 & § 539).
12. These exceptions were divorce jurisdiction and jurisdiction over a foreign "partnership
or association." 95 U.S. at 734-35.
13. See 95 U.S. at 737-38, 748. The parties inPennoyer claimed title to Oregon land which
Pennoyer had bought at a sheriffs sale conducted to satisfy an Oregon default judgment. At
issue was the validity of that judgment, which a third party had obtained against Neff, a resident of California. Justice Field's opinion concedes that if the third party had attached Neffs
land before, rather than after, judgment and had proceeded qu(lSi in rem, Pennoyer would
have acquired good title. See 95 U.S. at 723-24, 733.
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notice with the power to adjudicate. 14 Worse yet, the Court's insistence on
practices rooted in medieval usages 15 discouraged state experimentation at
a time when the deficiencies of the procedural law this country had inherited were widely recognized. Ironically, a quarter of a century before Pennoyer, tradition-bound England had enacted the Common Law Procedure
Act, 16 which permitted service abroad and thereby authorized the very "extraterritoriality" Justice Field condemned.
Thus the Supreme Court, left to its own devices, started off on the wrong
foot. Jurisdiction that rests on the service of transients or the attachment of
goods which pass through a state is obviously exorbitant if it can be used to
litigate facts that have no connection with the forum. Pennoyer prompted
process servers to hound hapless travellers, 17 if need be in airplanes, 18 and
to lure defendants away from their home state to gain an unfair advantage.
Similarly, by attaching assets in remote locations unscrupulous plaintiffs
could put defendants to the choice of either litigating in an inconvenient
forum or losing their property. Up to a point, the courts could curb the
most egregious abuses of such tag jurisdiction by inventing antidotes, such
as the forum non conveniens doctrine 19 and defenses premised on fraud
principles.20 But it proved difficult to cope with the obverse defect of Pennoyer, ie., its failure to provide a forum for meritorious causes where
neither the defendant nor sufficient property could be found within the
state.
Corporate defendants, in particular, were hard to "find" and slap with a
summons. In Saint Clair v. Cox ,21 Justice Field suggested that the problem
posed by such artificial entities could be resolved by requiring foreign corporations to agree to the appointment of a local agent as a target for local
process servers, which agreement "may be implied as well as expressed."22
Taking their cue from this case, state courts and legislatures began to develop a new jurisdictional rationale. Foreign corporations that failed to appoint local agents for service of process were held amenable to jurisdiction
on an "implied consent" theory. Liberally mixing fact with fiction, courts
deduced the "consent" and "presence" of such entities from the business
they did in the forum state.23 But Pennoyer also posed some difficulties as
14. See 95 U.S. at 726-27.
15. For the evolution of English notions of process in co=on law and equity courts, see 9
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 250-56, 348-51 {3d ed. 1944).
16. Co=on Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Viet., ch. 76. The current rules on English
long-arm jurisdiction derive from Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court promulgated
pursuant to the 1875 Judicature Act, 38 & 39 Viet., ch. 77. See generally G. CHESHIRE & P.
NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-95 (9th ed. 1974).
17. For a judicial reaction against such transient jurisdiction, see Fisher, Brown & Co. v.
Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 143-44, 34 A. 714, 729-30 (1895) (Hamersley, J., dissenting).
18. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
19. See A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 121-22 (1962).
20. See, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937); Blandin v. Ostrander, 239
F. 700 (2d Cir. 1917).
21. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
22. 106 U.S. at 356; see also Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
23. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the .Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 584-85 (1958).
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applied to human beings. To be sure, a dictum in that case helped resolve
the very common problem of divorce proceedings against absconding
spouses24 and in Milliken v. Meyer 25 the Supreme Court finally concluded
that individuals can be sued at their domicile. But it was still necessary to
fall back on the "implied consent" fiction developed in the corporate area
to give local relief to persons who were run over by nonresident motorists. 26
By the time the Supreme Court condoned this subterfuge, it had become
apparent that Pennoyer had succumbed to erosion and that a reorientation
was needed to make the law of jurisdiction more practical and plausible.
Drawing on the corporate and nonresident motorist cases, as well as the
principle of domiciliary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in International
Shoe Company v. Washington 21 articulated a novel principle. Retreating
from the idea that the defendant's amenability to suit should depend on a
symbolic exercise of power, Justice Stone's opinion established that nonresidents can be sued locally if they have a sufficient relationship, certain
"minimum contacts," with the forum state. If these contacts are "continuous and systematic" (as in the case of intensive business activities in the
forum state), then the foreign defendant is amenable to general jurisdiction,
ie., suable even on unrelated causes of action. But if the defendant's relationship to the forum is more attenuated, he may still be subject to limited
personal jurisdiction with respect to causes of action that arise from certain
local contacts, such as the commission of a tort within the state.
Although it retained the notion that due process is the fountainhead of
jurisdiction, the Court inverted the relationship between the Constitution
and the power of state courts. Pennoyer established that an adjudication
comported with due process only if the court had jurisdiction pursuant to
common law principles. In contrast, International Shoe teaches that process
is due, unless it transgresses "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."28 In other words, whereas Justice Field had ascertained compli•
ance with due process from fixed jurisdictional rules, Justice Stone purported to deduce the outer limits of jurisdiction from the "vague due
process clause."29 This new rationale expanded the potential reach of state
jurisdiction. Once the Supreme Court abandoned its attempt to prescribe
precise rules, the states were free to fashion new bases of jurisdiction, as
long as they stayed within the nebulous confines of "minimum contacts"
and "fair play." Seizing upon the opinion in International Shoe, state legislatures began to enact long-arm statutes to broaden their courts' power to
adjudicate.
One such statute, pursuant to which California asserted jurisdiction over
foreign insurers that collected premiums in the state, was at issue in McGee
24. 95 U.S. at 734-35. Justice Field tried to justify this deviation from the principle of
territoriality by characterizing divorce as a matter of "status."
25. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
26. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
27. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
28. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting from Justice Douglas' opinion in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)).
29. 326 U.S. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting).
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v. International L!fe Insurance Co. 30 According to the opinion Justice
Black wrote for a unanjmous Court, a single insurance policy which straddled state lines sufficed to enable the California court to adjudicate the
rights of the local beneficiary against a Texas corporation because the "contract had a substantial connection with that State" and because California
had a "manifest interest" in the resident plaintiff.31 This language seemed
to spell a further expansion of jurisdiction, for it suggested that the due
process calculus does not necessarily require a nexus between the defendant
and the forum. However, Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Hanson v. Denckla 32 rejected the substitution of _transactional contacts and forum interests for defendant contacts. Like Justice Field in Pennoyer,
Warren emphasized the "territorial limitations on the power of the respective States,"33 from which he deduced the requirement of "some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection
of its laws."34 Thus the idea that jurisdiction amounts to a quid pro quo for
the defendant's pursuit of forum benefits, which underlies the "implied consent" fiction, 35 gained new currency. The Pennoyer power rationale was
revived in modified form: the magic of defendant contacts replaced the
magic of service, and once again due process coalesced with the notion of
sovereignty.36
In the decades following this trilogy of decisions the Supreme Court
routinely denied petitions for certiorari in jurisdictional cases, leaving the
states free to experiment with long-arm legislation. Hesitantly at first, then
more boldly, state courts and legislatures expanded local jurisdiction in
multi-state cases. But while the direction was clear, the going proved tough.
Interpreting the new statutes in the light of International Shoe, McGee and
Hanson turned out to be an onerous task because of the amorphous nature
of the Supreme Court's guidelines and the deficiencies of statutory draftsmanship.37 To obviate the need for reconciling local legislation with consti30. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
31. 355 U.S. at 223.
32. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
33. 357 U.S. at 251.
34. 357 U.S. at 253.
35. See Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction lo Adjudicate: (a) Effective Litigation Values vs. the Territorial Imperative, (h) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 75
Nw. L. REV. 363, 369, 379-81, 420 (1980); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Chief Justice Warren said in Hanson:
[R]estrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts] are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has the
"minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over
him.
377 U.S. at 25.
37. The verbose and inanely worded Texas long-arm statute offers a telling example. See
TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & 1982-83). Even more carefully drafted
enactments are far from satisfactory, as shown by Pennsylvania's experimentation with the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, which had to be amended several times.
See Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Ind. Corp., 526 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1975); Gorso v.
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tutional mandates, which required judges to wrestle with two sets of
precepts at the same time, several states enacted statutes that simply conferred jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Supreme Court. 38
Some state courts achieved the same effect by construing local long-arm
legislation, irrespective of the statutory text, as an incorporation by reference of the Supreme Court case law.39 . Thus, as a practical matter, state law
and Supreme Court doctrine are once again converging. However, while
the states increasingly availed themselves of the full range of permissible
jurisdiction, at the end of the last decade the Supreme Court reverted to an
interventionist stance. Breaking a long period of silence, it decided four
jurisdictional cases in as many years, all of which struck down what the
Court considered to be overly expansive exercises of state power.
In Shaffer v. Heitner 40 the Court outlawed one remnant of Pennoyer,
ie., quasi in rem jurisdiction to litigate claims unrelated to the property
attached.41 According to Justice Marshall's majority opinion the constitutionality of all state jurisdictional assertions must be tested against a single
standard: that "set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 42 Subsequently, Kulko v. Superior Court 43 used the purposeful availment test propounded in Hanson to reverse a state court decision that would have
enabled children to seek an increase of support payments in their home
state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson44 held that the purposeful
availment formula precluded the assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign
distributor and retailer of a defective car. Finally, in Rush v. Savchuk ,45 the
Court relied on its decision in Shaffer to bar litigation by a local tort plaintiff against a local insurance company because the plaintiff had proceeded
against the nominal defendant on a quasi in rem theory. Whatever one
might think of the practical wisdom of these four recent Supreme Court
decisions,46 they do signal a retrenchment from the laissez-faire attitude of
International Shoe. Whereas the "minimum contacts" test was designed to
Bell Equip. Corp., 476 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1973); Comment, Pennsylvania's New Long-Arm
Statute: Extended Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 79 DICK. L. REV. 51 (1974). The
statute has since been revised to extend jurisdiction "to the fullest extent allowed under the
Constitution of the United States." 42 PA. CONS. STAT, § 5322(b) (Purdon 1981).
38. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE§ 410.10 (West 1973) ("any basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of this state or of the United States"); N.J. R. CT, § 4:4-4(c)(l) ("consistent
with due process of law").
39. See, e.g., Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 438 P.2d 135 (1968); Hall v. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), revd., 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984),
40. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
41. See 433 U.S. at 212 n.38. But see 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (leaving open the question of
recourse to attachment jurisdiction ''when no other forum is available to the plaintifl''); note 54
infra.
42. See 433 U.S. at 212. This includes Hanson's "purposeful availment" test. See 433 U.S.
at 216. But see 433 U.S. at 208 n.30 (''we do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines •.. such
as particularized rules governing adjudication of status are inconsistent with the standards of
fairness") (citation omitted).
43. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
44. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
45. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
46. See Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: A JJisma/
Prospect, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 907, 909-14 (1981).
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expand state court jurisdiction, the "purposeful availment" formula is
meant to be restrictive. The Court's current insistence on a single jurisdictional standard harkens back to Pennoyer, as does the statement in WorldWide Volkswagen that the fourteenth amendment "acts to ensure" state
sovereignty.47 Once again the Court seems willing to sacrifice the rational
administration of interstate justice in deference to conceptualism and the
myth of state sovereignty.48
Preoccupation with dogma necessarily diverts attention from practical
problems. This propensity is illustrated by Sha..ffer in which the Court, with
commendable zeal, set out to eradicate one (if not both49) of the remnants
of Pennoyer exorbitance. Regrettably, it picked a case in which quasi in rem
jurisdiction was made to serve a purpose which, as Justice Marshall apparently realized, 50 was constitutionally unobjectionable, namely to concentrate actions against the management of a Delaware corporation in a
Delaware court. By focusing on the jurisdictional rationale advanced,
rather than the permissible range of state court jurisdiction, the majority
opinion in Sha..ffer (as well as the one in Rush) recalls Justice Field's insistence on form over substance.51 At the same time, these opinions ignore
the needs of sound interstate procedure. Similarly, the Court's decision in
World-Wide Volkswagen compels wasteful concurrent litigation of identical
issues in different states. These examples suggest that rigid insistence on a
single jurisdictional standard is apt to impede the efficient disposition of
multi-party suits. Yet, it can also be argued that that standard is too broad
because it enables plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations in states that have
little or no connection with the facts. 52 Thus our current jurisdictional lore
47. 444 U.S. at 292. According to Justice White, the "sovereignty of each State . . . implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States - a limitation express or implicit
in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment." 444 U.S. at
293.
48. See 444 U.S. at 294 ("Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest a State of its power to render a valid judgment.").
49. The adoption of a single standard would seem to render transient jurisdiction unconstitutional. See, e.g., Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for Stale and Federal
Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 425 n.74 (1981) (listing recent commentary opposing transient jurisdiction); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw: The Consequences of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REV. 1031, 1035 (1978). Bui see Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732,
273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
50. Justice Marshall's opinion suggests that Delaware could enact a statute, as some states
have, which treats acceptance of a directorship in a Delaware corporation as an "implied consent" to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts. 433 U.S. at 216. Delaware has since enacted such
an implied consent statute. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (1982 Cum. Supp.).
51. See note 13 supra.
52. See Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate - The Lessening of Due Process in Choice ofLaw,
14 U.C.D. L. REV. 889, 894-95 (1981); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction lo Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1144 (1966). Indeed, an instinctive appreciation of
the possible overbreadth of "doing business" jurisdiction may explain the Supreme Court's
decision in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). But for that unstated consideration, it is
difficult to understand why it should be unconstitutional to permit a local plaintiff to sue a
"local" defendant in a local court.
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once again suffers from the twin defects of Pennoyer: overbreadth and insufficient coverage.
But whereas Pennoyer explicitly delineated the jurisdictional bases state
courts could use, the minimum-contacts-resulting-from-purposeful-availment formula is too fuzzy to furnish guidance in borderline cases. The split
opinions in World-Wide Volkswagen show that even the· Justices cannot
agree on its meaning, and the endless decisions that clutter the advance
sheets suggest the difficulties state and lower federal courts encounter when
forced to apply the test in practice. The resulting uncertainty allows even
basic issues, such as whether a local seller can sue a foreign buyer53 and
whether aliens are entitled to the same measure of due process as American
citizens and residents, 54 to remain unresolved. Thus, after more than a century of experimentation, the American law of interstate jurisdiction is as
muddled as ever.
The Supreme Court's continued preoccupation with doctrine also hampers inquiry into jurisdictional policies. For example, the Court and most
legal writers accept the purposeful availment formula as a given, a natural
consequence of territorial sovereignty. But if one looks at it through the
eyes of a litigator, it becomes apparent that that formula has an inherent
bias which favors individuals, particularly products liability claimants, who
sue large enterprises engaged in nationwide activities. There may be good
reasons for granting this class of plaintiffs a jurisdictional privilege, 55 but
one wonders why it should be withheld from other disadvantaged groups,
such as the support claimants in Kulko. Conversely, while it may make
sense to expose manufacturers of defective products to nationwide jurisdiction, other classes of defendants, such as eleemosynary institutions, arguably deserve a greater measure of protection against the hazards of forum
shopping. Yet, the territorialist dogma that currently prevails makes no allowance for distinctions of this kind. Blind to results, it treats General Motors in the same fashion as the Boy Scouts of America.
American jurisdictional law can be expected to remain unstable until
the Court resolves the inherent conflict between territorialism and "substan53. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (White & Powell,
JJ., dissenting) denying cert. to 591 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979).
54. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984), and Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), assume the
point without discussion. However, a contrary conclusion is suggested by a footnote in Sliafftr, which reads as follows: "This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the
question whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. This
"cryptic statement," Papendick v. Robert Bosch GmbH, 410 A.2d 148, 150 n.S (Del. S. Ct.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980), has caused courts to split on the question whether alien
defendants who lack minimum contacts.with the United States are still amenable to quasi in
rem juI1l!diction. Compare Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D.
Conn. 1977) (yes), and Rich v. Rich, 93 Misc. 2d 409, 402 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (yes),
with Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Co. 96 Misc. 2d 808, 409 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct.
1978),revd on other grounds, 61 App. Div. 2d 321,414 N.Y.S. 2d. 916 (1979) (no),and Istituto
Bancario Italiano SpA v. Hunter Engg. Co., 449 A.2d 210, 216 n.10 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1982)
(dubitante); see also note 116 iefra and accompanying text.
55. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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tialjustice." Awareness of the tension between these two components may
have prompted Justice White to recant, two years ago, his earlier attempt to
commingle the protection of defendants with the prerogatives of sovereignty.56 fu.Insurance Corp. efIreland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee
he wrote: "The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not
as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."57 This
opinion, in which seven of the Justices joined, could foreshadow a "substantial change in the law."58 The Supreme Court's most recent decisions,
however, continue to apply the purposeful availment test in a mechanical
fashion without regard to the policies and interests at stake. Thus, in two
cases decided this term the Justices explicitly refused to consider first
amendment concerns in upholding limited jurisdiction in libel actions
brought against the publisher of one magazine, and the president/editor
and a reporter of another. 59 In consequence, because of the omnipresence
of their "products," the media now face a greater jurisdictional exposure
than manufacturers, a result whose wisdom is surely less than obvious. The
latest case, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 60 reversed a
Texas Supreme Court decision on the ground that the contacts of the defendant, a Colombian corporation, with Texas were insufficient to justify
the exercise of general jurisdiction in a tort action resulting from a helicopter crash in Peru. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion assumes that alien
corporations are entitled to the same constitutional protection as sister-state
entities. Such evenhandedness is admirable, but one would have expected
some discussion of the underlying rationale in light of.the uncertain state of
the law and the divergent views held by the concurring and dissenting
judges below. If these recent cases are any indication, the Court remains
committed to a territorialist dogma that is unresponsive to substantive values and the exigencies of procedural policy.
II.

EUROPEAN LAW

Compared with Anglo-American law continental Europe's history of jurisdictional law has been both longer and smoother. The Justinian Code
already incorporated the maxim actor sequitur forum rei 61 and thus anticipated the decision in Milliken v. Meyer, 62 according to which the courts at
the defendant's residence are entitled to exercise general personal jurisdiction. In addition, Roman law recognized the concept of limited jurisdiction
by permitting the plaintiff to sue in tort at the place of wrongful conduct, to
bring contract actions at the place of execution or performance, and to vin56. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
57. 456 U.S. at 702 (footnote omitted). But cf. 456 U.S. at 702 n.10 (restriction of sovereign
power as a "function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause").
58. 456 U.S. at 714 (Powell, J., concurring).
59. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
1473 (1984).
60. 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
61. Code Just. 3.19.3, 3.13.2; see M. KASER, DAS ROMISCHE ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 183,478
(1966).
62. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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dicate property rights at the situs.63 In other words, fourteen hundred years
before International Shoe, the civil law, unhampered by constitutional doctrine and territorialist dogma, already premised jurisdiction on "minimum
contacts," and this idea continues to inform current European jurisdictional
law. 64 Conversely, the Pennoyer principles that for so long retarded the
evolution of American law never appealed to civilians. 65
However, the codes of several European countries do contain provisions
that are even more exorbitant than our former catch-as-catch-can jurisdiction. Thus, section 23 of the German Civil Procedure Code provides for in
personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who own assets in Germany. 66 This provision does not require a prior attachment or any nexus
between the litigation and the Federal Republic. Also, unlike the Oregon
statute before the United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer, section 23
does not limit jurisdiction to the value of the German assets and is therefore
yet more blatantly unfair than the quasi in rem jurisdiction67 outlawed by
Shaffer. The forum-shopping potential of the German rule should be readily apparent. Practically any large enterprise in the world is likely to have
some assets, such as an open account or an equity interest, in the Federal
Republic, and even nonresident individuals, for instance tourists who leave
personal objects behind, may feel the sting of this provision. 68 Since German law does not provide for a special appearance, 69 a foreign defendant
cannot even contest the presence of local property without submitting to
jurisdiction;.nor is a default judgment based on a plaintiff's spurious allegation that the defendant owned something in the Federal Republic open to
collateral attack.70 Yet more exorbitant than the German assets jurisdiction
is the rule derived from article 14 of the French Civil Code,71 which enables
French plaintiffs to sue anyone in French courts72 whether or not the dispute has any connection with France. At the same time article 15 of the
Code provides that Frenchmen can only be sued in France. Although this
blatant jurisdictional chauvinism has been criticized in and outside
France,73 several European nations have copied the French scheme in one
63. M. KASER, supra note 61, at 184, 478.
64. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 363 (4th ed. 1980); Weser, Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 328-36 (1961).
65. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 362, 363; Pillet, Jurisdiction in Actions Between Foreigners, 18 HARV. L. REV. 325, 335 (1905).
66. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 372-73; deVries & Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Persona/Actions-A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 4410WA L. REV. 306, 332-34 (1959); Weser,
supra note 64, at 327-28.
61. See Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition ofJudgments:
The Common Market .Draft, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 1004-06 (1967).
68. For a vivid and poetic account of Jean Claude Killy's experience in Austria, (which,
like the Federal Republic, authorizes assets jurisdiction), see Siegel, Case & Comment, In Vagrant Verse, 16 CASE & COM. Sept.-Oct. 1971, at 56, 62-63.
69. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 391 n.l.
10. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 380-81.
11. See deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note 66, at 316-30; Weser, supra note 64, at 324-25.
72. The only American analogue is divorce jurisdiction, for which the petitioner's domicile
suffices. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
73. See, e.g., 2 H. BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 483 (7th ed.
1983); M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2d ed. 1950).
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form or another.74 To make matters worse, continental European countries
do not recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine,75 so that their courts
cannot decline jurisdiction even if a suit is brought solely to harass the
defendant.
Thus, pursuant to the laws of several European nations, jurisdiction is
largely controlled by the law of the jungle, and unfortunately their recognition practices are as narrow as their jurisdictional assertions are broad, except to the extent that treaties afford relief. Such a state of affairs hardly
accords with the needs of a quasi-federal system like the Common Market.
But the architects of the Communities, less prescient than the framers of the
United States Constitution, failed to include precepts akin to our due process and full faith and credit clauses in the constitutive documents. The
only pertinent provision is found in article 220 of the Rome Treaty76 which,
among other things, exhorts the member states to enter into negotiations
"with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ... the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement
of judgments . . . ." The committee of experts appointed to draft a convention that would implement this provision recognized that its scope was
much too narrow. Stretching the word "formalities" far beyond its normal
meaning, the experts elaborated a "modern, liberal law"77 that put the intra-European recognition of judgments on a solid treaty basis. In general
outline and numerous details the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters78 closely
resembles the rules which the United States Supreme Court developed
under the due process and full faith and credit clauses. There are, however,
several instructive differences.
The framers of the Brussels Convention had a dual advantage. They
could draft on a clean slate, unconstrained by precedent and dogma, yet
they were free to draw on rules and principles existent in the laws of the
Communities' member states,79 including earlier treaties and conventions
to which these nations were parties. 80 Although the available sources are
74. See Weser, supra note 64, at 324-27.
75. See Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and
to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 59) 71,
97 (Mar. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Schlosser Report].
76. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (entered into force Jan. I, 1958).
77. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement ofjudgments in
civil and commercial matters, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 59) I, 7 (Mar. 5, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Jenard Report].
78. Sep. 27, 1968, 15 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 299) 32 (Dec. 31, 1972) (entered into force
Feb. I, 1973). The convention was first revised to accommodate the accession of Denmark,
Ireland, and Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. 77 (No. L 304) (Oct.
30, 1978). It was again amended upon the accession of Greece. 25 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L
388) I (1982). Citations are to the latest version which has not yet entered into force [hereinafter cited as Brussels Convention].
79. See Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 3-6 (recognition of judgments); id at 14-83
(jurisdiction).
80. See Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 6-7.
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silent on this point, 81 one may surmise that the committee of experts also
consulted the laws of such federal systems as the United States, Switzerland
and Australia. Whatever the scope of its comparative research, the committee made good use of the available materials. In superimposing a new order
on the member states' discordant, and often xenophobic, jurisdictional and
recognition practices82 the experts plainly emulated American law. They
realized the cogency of the principle which the United States Supreme
Court had established early on, namely that the enforcement of a judgment
should hinge primarily on the jurisdiction of the court that rendered it. To
assure the congruence of adjudicatory power and judgment recognition, the
experts were not content merely to circumscribe the outer limits of permissible member state jurisdiction as the Supreme Court did in International
Shoe. Instead, they defined the appropriate jurisdictional bases as a matter
of supranational law. Like Justice Field in Pennoyer, the draftsmen could
rely on "rules and principles established in our [European] systems of jurisprudence,"83 except that they had more to work with. Although the note
which the Common Market Commission had sent to the member states in
1959 to invite negotiations on the Convention maintained that 'Jurisdiction
. . . is derived from . . . sovereignty," 84 the experts did not attempt to deduce rules from that dubious concept but preferred to make their choices of
jurisdictional provisions on grounds of policy and common sense. Realizing that exorbitance is incompatible with basic tenets of interstate comity,
they outlawed the use against Common Market domiciliaries of article 14
of the French Civil Code and section 23 of the German Civil Procedure
Code, as well as kindred provisions of other nations. 85 They also replaced
the nonexorbitant member state rules with a catalog of detailed jurisdictional bases suitable to the needs of the Communities' quasi-federal system.
In this fashion the experts produced a "double convention" 86 that, in American parlance, combines a long-arm statute and full faith and credit in a
single instrument.
In broad outline, the jurisdictional scheme of the Brussels Convention is
as follows:
I. The courts at the defendant's domicile (or, in the case of an enterprise,
its principal place of business87) have general jurisdiction;88
2. Enterprises that maintain a branch or other establishment in a member
state can be sued there on causes of action arising out of these local
81. The Jenard, supra note 77, and Schlosser, supra note 75, Reports do not refer to any
such comparative researches. Regrettably, the preparatory work of the commission of experts
has not been published. See G. DROZ, COMPETENCE JUDICIAJRE ET EFFETS DES JUOEMENTS
DANS LE MARCHE COMMUN 2 (1977).
82. The member states' jurisdictional exorbitance is matched by the narrow-mindedness of
their recognition practices. See Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 3-6, 19-20.
83. See text at note 9 supra.
84. Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 3.
85. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 3.
86. Herzog, The Common Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the Eeforcement of Judgments: An Interim Update, 11 VA. J. INTL. L. 417, 420 n.16 (1977). The official report speaks
of a "convention based on rules of direct jurisdiction." Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 7.
87. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 53, par. I.
88. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 2, par. I.
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operations; 89
3. Limited personal jurisdiction is provided for contract90 and tort91
actions;
4. There is exclusive local jurisdiction in actions concerning real roperty,92 the internal affairs of corporations and other associations, 9 and
rights recorded in public registers;94
5. Certain classes of plaintiffs, i.e., consumers, policyholders and support
claimants, are accorded the jurisdictional privilege to litigate in the member state in which they are domiciled; 95
6. Special rules liberally authorize joining and impleading parties not
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court in which the principal
action is pending;96
7. By means of forum-selection clauses the parties can stipulate to the
jurisdiction of member state courts.97

f

The Convention's jurisdictional provisions compare favorably with our
long-arm statutes. In contrast to American state legislators, who had to
take into account not altogether consistent Supreme Court pronouncements, the European draftsmen could rely on their own best judgment,
which helped make their work product tidier, more functional and more
precise. In particular, they were able to design appropriate rules to govern
multi-party practice and to accord jurisdictional privileges to certain disadvantaged groups, provisions that would not pass our Supreme Court's constitutional muster. In this respect the Brussels Convention may appear
permissive to an American observer; however, it also protects enterprises
against undue jurisdictional exposure. In contrast to the uncertainty which
prevails in the United States concerning the extent to which foreign corporations doing business locally are amenable to general jurisdiction,98 the
Convention is quite specific. According to articles 2 and 53, par. 1, unrelated causes of action can only be brought at a member state corporation's
principal place of business. Local operations expose such entities to limited
jurisdiction only, and even if they "do business" through a local branch,
89. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 5, No. 5.
90. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 5, No. I {place of performance).
91. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 3, No. 3 (place of"harmful event"). In view of
the fact that a number of European countries permit private parties to seek damages incidental
to a criminal proceeding, see R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 457-61, the Convention also
provides for concurrent jurisdiction over civil claims raised in criminal cases. See art. 5, No. 4.
Special provisions govern litigation relating to trusts (art. 5, No. 6) and salvage claims (art. 5,
No. 7).
92. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 16, No. I (situs).
93. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 16, No. 2 (principal place of business).
94. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 16, Nos. 3 and 4 (place of registration).
95. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 14 (consumer transactions, as defined in
art. 13); art. 8, par. 2 (policyholders); art. 5, No. 2 (support claimants); see also art. 9 (liability
and real property insur~rs suable at place of harm) and art. 10, pars. 2 and 3 (direct actions).
96. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 6, Nos. I and 2; see also art. 6, No. 3
(counterclaims).
97. See Brussels Convention,supra note 78, art. 17. Articles 12 ~d 15 restrict the contractual designation of a forum in cases involving policyholders and consumers.
98. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 297-302, 332-37 (1982); note 52 supra
and accompanying text.
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article 5(5) restricts jurisdiction to causes of action related to the branch's
activities.
To assure uniform application of these jurisdictional rules, the member
states of the Common Market have ratified a Protocol99 that provides for
supranational review by empowering the Court of Justice of the European
Communities to interpret the Convention upon a reference from national
courts. 100 Since 1976 the Court has issued rulings in over thirty cases that
have dealt with a wide variety of issues, ranging from jurisdiction in a major international pollution litigation 101 to the enforcement of a Belgian
small claims court judgment in the Netherlands. 102 The case law accumulated within the relatively short span of eight years 103 sensibly elaborates
and clarifies the Convention's rules. Given the firm guidance provided by
specific and well thought out provisions, the task of the Court of Justice as
the ultimate arbiter of the Common Market's law of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments is less demanding than that facing the United
States Supreme Court. At the same time, the European court has shown
considerable creativity in giving many of these rules a supranational content to ensure uniformity of application. 104 Moreover, several of its deci99. Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 304) 50 (Oct. 30, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
100. The procedure of referring issues to the Court of Justice resembles that for preliminary rulings pursuant to art. 177 of the Rome Treaty, which is discussed in Hay & Thompson,
The Community Court and Supremacy of Community Law: A Progress Report, 8 VAND. J.
TRANSNATL. L. 651 (1975). However, there are several significant differences between the two
methods of supranational review. See Kohler, The Case Law of the European Court on t/1e
Judgments Convention, Part I, 7 EUR. L. REV. 3, 4-6 (1982).
IOI. Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A. (Case No. 21/76),
1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735 (Preliminary Ruling).
102. De Wolfv. Harry Cox B.V. (Case No. 42/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1759 (Preliminary Ruling).
103. For a review of cases decided up to June of 1981, see Kohler, supra note 100, and
Kohler, Part II, 1 EUR. L. REV. 103 (1982); see a/.ro Freeman, The EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments, 3 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 496 (1981),
104. Although the Court of Justice does consult the laws of the Common Market nations
in giving content to the terms of the Brussels Convention, it tends to favor an "autonomous"
interpretation, i.e., to fashion its own definitions rooted in supranational law. As the court said
in an early case:
(T]o ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from [the
Brussels Convention] for the Contracting States and the persons to whom it applies are
equal and uniform. . . . the concept in question must therefore be regarded as mdependent and must be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Convention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the
national legal systems.
LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol (Case No. 29/76), 1976 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1541, 1551 (Preliminary Ruling) (interpreting the phrase "civil and commercial matters" in art. I of the Convention). For other instances of"independent" characterization, see Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG (Case No. 33/78), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183
(Preliminary Ruling) (definition of"branch, agency or other establishment" in art. 5, no. 5 of
the Convention); Sanders v. van der Pulte (Case No. 73/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2383
(Preliminary Ruling) (definition of "tenancies of immovable property" in art. 16, no. I of the
Convention). .But see Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No. 12/76), 1976 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473 (Preliminary Ruling) ("place of performance of the obligation in
question" in art. 5, no. I of the Convention defined by member state law applicable to such
obligation pursuant to the forum's conflict oflaws rules). For discussion and evaluation of the
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sions show commendable concern about both fairness in adjudication 105
and important substantive policies. 106
In at least one respect the Court of Justice has clearly gone beyond the
mere interpretation of preordained rules. Early on, the European judges,
hypothesizing a link between the Brussels Convention and the Rome
Treaty, established that the fundamental principles which inform the Common Market's constitutive documents also apply to the Convention. 107
This idea has far-reaching implications. The court has long recognized that
the Communities' legal order must adequately protect human rights, and it
has claimed the power to create the necessary safeguards from constitutional provisions found in the laws of the member states and in the European Human Rights Convention. 108 Hence, the court can be expected to
intervene against jurisdictional practices that jeopardize fundamental
rights. A first step in this direction is its emphasis on the opportunity to be
heard 109 and other aspects of procedural faimess. 110
court's development of supranational concepts, see Freeman, supra note 103, at 504-06, 508;
Kohler, supra note 100, at 7-13.
The national/supranational conflicts posed by the Brussels Convention correspond to the
state/federal conflicts problems which the Supreme Court has encountered in other contexts.
Compare United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (holding state law to be
controlling), with Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding federal
law to be controlling).
105. See Pendy Plastic Prods. B.V. v. Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft GmbH (Case No.
228/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2723 (Preliminary Ruling) (to protect defendant's right to
be heard, the court in which recognition is sought may review the adequacy of service);
Klomps v. Michel (Case No. 166/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1593 (Preliminary Ruling)
(recognition court may review sufficiency of time to arrange for defense); Elefanten Schuh
GmbH v. Jacqmain, (Case No. 150/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671 (Preliminary Ruling)
(defendant entitled to present jurisdictional objections together with defenses on the merits);
Denilauler v. S.n.c. Couchet Freres (Case No. 125/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1553 (Preliminary Ruling) (ex parte attachment not entitled to recognition in other member states).
106. See, e.g., Ivenel v. Schwab, (Case No. 133/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1891 (Preliminary Ruling) ("place of performance" in art. 5, no. 1 construed to confer jurisdiction on
courts of employee's place of work to protect weaker party); Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v.
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace (Case No. 21/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735 (Preliminary
Ruling) (place of "harmful event" construed to allow tort victim a choice between suing at
place of defendant's conduct or at place of injury).
107. In its very first judgment on the Brussels Convention the court stressed that "the Convention must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its relationship with the [Rome] Treaty." lndustrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No.
12/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, 1484 (Preliminary Ruling). In Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe & Co. v. Eurocontrol (Case Nos. 9 and 10/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1517, 1525, (Preliminary Ruling), the court referred to the "principle oflegal certainty in the
Community legal system and the objectives of the Brussels Convention in accordance with
Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, which is at its origin." See Kohler, supra note 100, at 14.
108. See, e.g., J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the Eur.
Communities (Case No. 4/73), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, (Case No. 11/70),
1970 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 1125 (Preliminary Ruling); Stauder v. Ulm, (Case No. 29/69), 1969
C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 419 (Preliminary Ruling); see also Dagtoglou, Human Rights and European Community Law, 56 TuL. L. REV. 294 (1981); Juenger, The Role of Comparative Law in
Regional Organizations, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL REVOLUTION 49, 60-63 (J. Hazard & w. Wagner eds. 1974); The Emerging European
Constitution, [1978] AM. SOCY. INTL. L. PROC. 166.
109. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
I 10. See AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 155/79),
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For the American observer, the procedure under the Protocol to the
Brussels Convention holds an interesting lesson. The pertinent rules 111 enable the member state governments 112 to present their views in statements
and written observations addressed directly to the court, and they have
availed themselves of this opportunity on numerous occasions. 113 Although the governments frequently side with their nationals' legal position,
the summaries published in the reports do not reveal much concern on the
part of these governments about a possible infringement of their sovereignty. Thus, there is empirical evidence for Justice White's remark in
Compagnie des Bauxites that jurisdictional issues touch upon individual liberty interests rather than state prerogatives. 114 This evidence is all the more
convincing if one considers that the member states of the Common Market
are truly sovereign nations with divergent histories, laws and languages.
The comparison between the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Convention and our own awkward approaches suggests that the Europeans are
ahead of us. In one respect, however, the Convention falls seriously short
of the standards of jurisdictional propriety that have emerged in the United
States. Since state court jurisdiction is circumscribed by the fourteenth
amendment and since nonresident aliens are entitled to due process protection, 115 the American law on jurisdiction is, on its face, nondiscriminatory, 116 although the Supreme Court has never expressly confirmed this
1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1575 (attorney-client privilege); Estasis Salotti di Colzani v.
RUWA Polstereimaschinen GmbH (Case No. 24/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1831 (Preliminary Ruling) ("informed consent" required for forum selection clause that changes the
normal rules of jurisdiction).
111. Protocol art. 5, par. I incorporates by reference the Protocol on the Statute of the
Court of Justice of the European Economic Co=unities, Apr. 17, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 147
(1958), art. 20, par. 2 of which authorizes the submission of statements and written observations in proceedings concerning preliminary rulings.
112. This class includes those that are not parties to the Brussels Convention and the Protocol but have merely undertaken to accede to these instruments. See Industrie Tessili Italiana
Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No. 12/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1473 (Preliminary Ruling)
(observations submitted by the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom).
113. See, e.g., Pendy Plastic Prods. B.V. v. Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft mbH (Case No.
228/81), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2723 (Preliminary Ruling); Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV
v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA (Case No. 21/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1735 (Preliminary Ruling).
114. See text at note 57 supra.
115. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308,318 (1952) (dictum); Russian Volunteer Fleet
v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931). But c.f. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) ("legitimate distinction" between citizens and aliens).
116. Even federal courts, whose jurisdiction is limited by the due process clause of the fifth
rather than the fourteenth amendment, consider it axiomatic that a nonresident alien's amenability to suit is controlled by International Shoe and its progeny. See, e.g., American Land
Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1983) (diversity case); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 n.7
(9th Cir. 1977) (trademark infringement); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d
1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975) (patent infringement); see also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148
(1982) (foreign nation a "person" for purposes of due process). Indeed, several circuit court
opinions have intimated that the defendant's alienage and nonresidence are factors that caution against the assertion of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rocke v. Canadian Auto. Sport Club, 660
F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1981) ("sovereignty barrier" higher if defendant resides in a foreign
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conclusion. 117 In stark contrast, the Brussels Convention openly discriminates against outsiders. While article 3 outlaws recourse to the member
states' exorbitant jurisdictional bases in actions brought against Common
Market domiciliaries and corporations, 118 article 4 expressly authorizes the
continued use of such provisions against parties domiciled outside the
Common Market. 119 The dreary catalog of transgressions upon comity and
general decency contained in article 3 includes not only article 14 of the
French Civil Code and section 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure,
but several equally unreasonable jurisdictional assertions found in the laws
of other member states. Indeed, to accommodate the accession of the Communities' new members to the Brussels Convention, that catalog was further lengthened and now includes English transient jurisdiction, Scottish
and Irish foreign attachments, as well as Danish and Greek assets jurisdiction. Worse yet, the experts charged with drafting the revised version explicitly rejected theforum non conveniens doctrine as un-European and too
burdensome for plaintiffs. 120 Thus, outsiders are left without even a modicum of protection against excessive forum shopping and harassment. 121
nation); Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Supreme Court jurisdictional cases applicable "a fortiori" to Taiwan company); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972) (jurisdiction based on
effects within the state to be asserted ''with caution, panicularly in an international context").
On the other hand, some opinions suggest that a lesser forum nexus is required to proceed
against aliens in federal question cases, because it should be permissible to aggregate all of the
contacts such defendants have with the entire United States even in the absence of a federal
rule or statute that explicitly authorizes nationwide service. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237-39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981) (dictum); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum);
Cyromedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). But see Wells Fargo &
Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (aggregation of contacts with
the United States as a whole would require amendment of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1281-83 (D.N.J. 1980), a.ffd 654
F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981) (same).
117. See note 54supra and accompanying text; text following note 60supra.
118. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
119. Nor is such unequal treatment limited to jurisdiction; it permeates the entire Convention and affects the rules on recognition as well as such important safeguards as the right to be
heard. See generally Juenger, La Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septemhre 1968 et la courtoisie
internationale, 72 R.C.D.I.P. 37 (1983). In particular, the Convention requires the enforcement of judgments of other member states against "outsiders" even if such judgments are
premised on exorbitant jurisdictional bases. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78 an. 28;
von Mehren, Recognition and E,iforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General
Theory and Current Practice in the European Community and the United States, 81 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1044, 1059 (1981).
120. See Schlosser Report, supra note 75, at 97-98.
121. The Convention's only concession to the interests of third nations concerns the enforcement of judgments premised on exorbitant grounds. Brussels Convention art. 59, par. l,
permits a member state to refuse to enforce such judgments against the domiciliaries of any
third nation with which the member state has ratified a recognition treaty containing a provision to that effect. For the history of this concession, see Nadelmann, The Common Market
Judgments Convention and a Hague Co,iference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1282 (1969). Art. 59 may remain illusory, as demonstrated by the inability of the
United States to negotiate a recognition treaty with the United Kingdom. See E. SCOLES & P.
HAY, supra note 98, at 971-72; von Mehren, supra note 119, at 1060 n.61. These authors adduce several reasons to explain the failure of the two major common law nations to reach
agreement. In addition, the difficulty of drafting a treaty that fully takes into account existing
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Yet, strange as it may seem, there is no indication in reported decisions
to suggest that the Brussels Convention's jurisdictional discrimination has
posed much of a practical problem. So far, the Court of Justice has never
been asked to deal with issues relating to article 4, perhaps because European counsel are less adept at forum shopping, or less inclined to resist
jurisdictional impositions by raising constitutional arguments than their
American counterparts. Be that as it may, the Convention does expose outsiders to chicanery and miscarriages of justice. Fortunately, as mentioned
earlier, 122 the Court of Justice is sensitive to the protection of fundamental
rights and the need for adequate procedural safeguards. Conceivably, the
judges in Luxembourg may find a way to remedy, or at least to mitigate, the
discriminatory aspects of the Brussels Convention once the matter is
presented to them.
CONCLUSION

This brief comparison of interstate and supranational approaches to judicial jurisdiction indicates that the problems posed by federalism on either
side of the Atlantic call for similar responses. The European Community
has made impressive progress coping with these problems in a remarkably
short span of time. Leaving aside its discriminatory features, the functional
and pragmatic European approach appears preferable to our reliance on an
"imprecise inquiry." 123 The experience gathered under the Brussels Convention demonstrates that multistate jurisdictional problems are amenable
to rational solutions, and that national sovereignty need not inhibit the
framing of workable rules. While this observation suggests the need for a
reassessment of the territorialist dogma that has prevailed in the United
States, it is no less true that the Europeans might gain from paying attention
to American ideas about fundamental rights and procedural fairness. It
would be deplorable if these two major systems, linked by political realities
and a shared belief in the rule of law, were to disregard each other's
accomplishments.

Supreme Court case law, and the inflexibility of the American negotiating position that re•
suited from the need to abide by constitutional limitations, may have played a role.
122. See notes 107-10 supra and accompanying text.
123. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1487 (1984).

